Tag Archive for 'ethics'

A Short Survey of Interesting Topics

Published
by
michael lee
on 29 March 2008
in faith and theology, groupthink, philosophy and university
. 35 Comments

I have 7 students in my Music and Ethics class this semester. They’re just about cresting the first difficult climb in writing their thesis papers. They’ve done the bulk of the research, and had to turn in a full footnoted outline of their argument. All that’s left for most of them is to spill the actual ink, and turn it into something readable. And then, of course, the editing.

They’ve picked some pretty interesting topics, so I thought I’d throw them out here for you folks to peruse. These are their thesis statements, roughly, along with some background.

  1. Sacredness is an ascribed quality, not an objective quality, therefore music that is sacred is always sacred to some person, or group of people. It is sacred because it serves the function of producing desired internal states, considered spiritually significant by people who call the music sacred. This means that 1) people outside of that group have no obligation to the “sacredness” of the music, and 2) it is inappropriately limiting to the creative process to force composers to work within a certain genre of music because of its “sacredness”.
  2. The emphasis on competition within High School music programs is detrimental to the education process. A music educator has an obligation to select repertoire for their ensemble based on artistic merit and educational value, and not competitive value.
  3. A film composer’s evaluation of a potential project should be based on the over-arching primary theme of the film, rather than content that serves that theme. She may choose to work on a film with a strong positive primary message, even if the film also contains graphic sexuality and violence. If the strength of the primary theme outweighs the presence of objectionable content, the project as a whole can be considered good, and worthwhile.
  4. There are three categories of repertoire that are frequently controversial in music education: music with sexual themes (sensual and explicit operatic works), music with overt religious themes (everything written between 600 and 1600 C.E. in Western Music), and music by controversial composers (Wagner’s pro-genocide stance, for example). A music educator has an obligation to perform these works, in spite of the controversy. To avoid them both limits that artistic experience of the students, and presents a skewed perspective on the scope and history of musical literature.
  5. A composer’s original intent is the fundamental guiding principle for the interpretation of a work. Contemporary performers and conductors have an obligation not to deviate from the best understanding of the composer’s intent in their interpretation and execution of a work.
  6. A musician has an obligation to only create works that best express their aesthetic judgment. It is a violation of the purpose of music, and the nature of the musician, to make choices based on values of broad appeal or commercial viability. There are strong parallels between a musician using their craft for less-than-art purposes, and prostitution, in that both treat the person as a means to an end, in violation of the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. (This is going to be a helluva paper - this student is incredibly bright, and is making some very, very strong arguments in support of this thesis. Once he’s finished, I’ll give more of my thoughts on this topic).
  7. The lyrical content of music is capable of making moral claims, even in poetic and non-propositional formats. Songwriters have an obligation to produce works whose moral claims contribute to social unity. Songwriters may not plead ignorance in their understanding of these moral claims, and must take responsibility for their social impact as contributing factors to social change. To claim that songs are not sufficient causes for any particular social change is not an argument against their contributory power to those changes. The two primary case studies will be the identification by Klebold and Harris with the music of Marilyn Manson prior to the Columbine High School shootings, and the release of the song F*ck Tha Police by NWA prior to the 1992 Los Angeles riots. (I think this student is going to argue that the moral claims of F*ck Tha Police actually fulfill the obligation toward social unity, by exposing an underlying reality that then prompted broader attention and calls for change.)

It’s fun to sit in conferences with these students and read through their arguments, to see the evidence of their critical thinking. I love the fact that I don’t have to prod any of them to find the value in this process - they all seem to understand that spending time thinking deeply about these themes will be beneficial to their development as musicians, and as people.

Moral Theory: Introduction

Published
by
michael lee
on 15 May 2007
in philosophy, university and writing workshop
. 11 Comments

Posts in the Moral Theory series

  1. Moral Theory: Introduction
  2. Moral Theory: Divine Command Ethics
  3. Moral Theory: Natural Law

An Introduction

Well, now that the Music and Ethics course has been approved here at APU, I have to get serious about actually teaching it. That means brushing up on some of that good old philosophicating. Good practice for me, fun for you, and safe for the whole family. Unless Uncle Jimmy is a nihilist, in which case, probably not safe for him.

I’m going to write a series of posts, each trying to answer the question “What makes an action right?” Each post will look at how different schools of thought, different moral theories, answer this question. My goal is to discuss these theories with a minimum of technical philosophical language, in a way that invites everybody to be part of the conversation. I can’t promise that it won’t involve some heavy lifting, but I will try to make sure that the ideas are presented clearly.

the property of ought

This question, “What makes an action right,” the starting place for thinking about ethics, requires a little bit of explanation before we can understand what it’s really asking. There are a few assumptions buried in the question that we need to tease out before we can really ask it.

The most basic assumption of the question is that actions can have properties, features about them that can be talked about in the abstract. If I’m holding a red apple, it has the property of “redness”, and I can talk about the redness in the abstract, without having to talk about the apple itself.

What does it mean to say that actions have properties? Well, think about someone who steals candy from a child. In addition to talking about the facts of the event (at a certain time and place, this person caused this series of events that affected this person, blah blah blah), we can also say, “That act was selfish.” It identifies something about that act, some quality or group of qualities that can be identified, and discussed in the abstract. “Selfish acts cause one to become embittered” is a statement about abstract properties, not about any one act.

So, the first assumption in the question “What makes an action right” is that an act has properties (not all philosophical systems will agree with this point - more later!).

The second assumption is that some property, or set of properties, about an act can together cause that act to be ethical, or unethical. In other words, we can evaluate an action for abstract qualities, and those qualities will determine if we have an obligation to perform that act, or to not perform it.

Let’s assume we determine that selfishness = unethical. We can then look at an act, and ask whether or not it contains the property of selfishness. If it does, then it’s unethical. We establish a standard for measuring actions that is separate from any one action, which all actions can be evaluated against.

If this works, we can then say that the act has an additional property: call it the property of ought. Action that have it, we are obligated to do. Actions that contain it in the negative (ought not), we are prohibited from doing.

So, the conversation in ethics centers around this question:

What property of an action determines that we ought to do it?

In the series of posts to follow, I’ll try to show how that question is answered by Divine Command Theory, Natural Law Theory, Utilitarianism, Kant (how awesome do you have to be to get on this list with just your last name? Pretty awesome), Moral Relativism, Moral Pluralism, and (my favorite, which is why I put it last) Virtue Ethics.

Hang on to your protractors - it’s about to get nerdy up ins!

Next in series: Moral Theory: Divine Command Ethics

Ethical Content as a Commodity

Published
by
michael lee
on 11 August 2005
in philosophy and politics
. 15 Comments

It may not be intuitively obvious what American Apparel, fair-trade coffee, the Toyota Prius, and Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch have in common. The connection is hiding beneath the surface, and it signals what may well be a seismic shift in the function of free-market economies. The connection is this: each one of these products carries something in addition to the basic goods, some value added component that makes them marketable in spite of a higher initial purchase price: they have an ethical content.

Ethical content is becoming a market commodity. It is being advertised and sold as an integrated corollary to consumer transactions, something extra that you can purchase along with your coffee, or jeans, or car. At the Starbucks online store, a pound of fair-trade coffee costs $11.49, while a pound of houseblend costs $9.99. What am I buying for my extra $1.50? It seems to me that I’m getting at least the appearance of a more ethical process, a transaction that favors local growers more than it favors distributors and consumers. I am buying an ethical commodity.

The existence of the ethical commodity can be seen in the reverse, as well. Companies like Walmart are perceived as having a negative ethical content in their products. In pursuit of the lowest possible source-to-shelf costs, their economic and environmental policies are perceived as being detrimental to both local and global communities. In this case, the difference between paying $18 for Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (Book 6) at your local book seller and paying $15.69 at Walmart is a negative ethical commodity. You’ve saved two bucks by not purchasing a more ethical process along with your savory teen fiction.

The idea of commoditized value in a transaction beyond the consumable goods is nothing new. Think about the difference between a $25 pair of shoes from Payless and a $225 pair of shoes from Nordies. Of course there are some differences in materials and in manufacturing, but most of the difference in cost between those two shoes has to do with the name Cole Haan, or Steve Madden, or Kenneth Cole. You’re buying a fashion commodity along with the piece of stitched leather. The value of the fashion commodity is demonstrated by the fact that people will buy $225 shoes. Think too about the difference between buying a mini-van and buying an SUV. For most people, the mini-van is more practical, and more economical, both in initial price and in long term ownership costs. But when you drive a mini-van, nobody thinks you might be on your way up to Yosemite for some base-jumping off of Half Dome. There is a lifestyle image that is commoditized with the SUV that doesn’t exist in the mini-van. When my wife and I bought a stroller for my daughter Sophia, we purchased one that had a higher safety rating than similar models. In addition to the cost of materials and assembly, we purchased a perceived safety commodity.

The emergence of an ethical commodity is a significant shift in economics. It is a redemptive use of one of the most powerful social forces around; free-market capital. The establishment of ethical content as a valuable commodity means that, rather than market forces driving consumers toward the lowest price, consumers can make decisions about whether or not to purchase a better process with their goods. In a commodified economy, this means that there are people who will want to purchase ethical content, and there are also people who will want to be perceived as people who purchase ethical content. For both groups, market forces will propel them toward goods and services with recognized higher ethical content (ordering Striped Bass instead of Black Sea Bass). As a raging free-market fanboy, you can see how this would make me ecstatic. Anything that accomplishes beneficial results within the community without sacrificing consumer choices or economic incentive is a good thing, and a robust thing.

I do, of course, have some concerns. First, I’m concerned that ethical content might be a fad. Introducing elevated market prices for fair-trade coffee growers in South America might be a good thing, but it can turn into a disastrous thing if those markets collapse when ethicism becomes unfashionable again. The farmer who made capital investments in equipment and stock on the basis of those inflated prices will be hardest hit when he can no longer sell his goods at $1.25 / lb. The same is true for the New England fisherman who invests in equipment to switch over to line-caught seafood, on the assumption that investing in a more ethical process will enable him to recoup that investment by marketing to ethical consumers. When those consumers are no longer willing to pay an extra $2 for his more ethical process, he is stuck bearing the costs of the market’s fadishness.

I’m also worried about the social perceptions that will trickle down to the poorest consumers. There are millions of people in this county for whom there is no real option; they can’t afford the two dollar difference between the cheapest item and the item with higher ethical content. American Apparel is not an option for them, the Walmart t-shirt is. In our striving for a more socially and environmentally aware marketplace, we need to make sure that we don’t denigrate those who can’t afford the commodity of ethical content.

We also need more accountability from independent organizations. As ethical commodity becomes a viable marketing tool, there will be companies that want the shine without the spit. There will be companies that appropriate the language and appearance of ethical content without the supporting processes. The Fairtrade Foundation and the Seafood Watch list are both examples of independent organizations with transparent goals and standards. We need similar organizations for apparel, sustainable farming, retail, and every other facet of this robust economic milieu. Consumers who are choosing to purchase ethical content with their goods need to do so in an informed way, and these sorts of accountability structures help ensure that.

So here we are. It has never been easier to make ethical choices as a consumer, and to do so within a coherent market structure that preserves consumer choice and economic incentive. I’m a fan.